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Abstract:
In the aftermath of Anders Breivik’s shooting spree and bombing in Norway, many people asked 
where did the anger and the violence come from? The article examines the contemporary trends 
in political and social discourses to conflate opponents with enemies. Popular discourses, 
television and on-line media, radio talk shows and even newspaper spread the language of threat 
and insecurity, and the idea that the biggest threats may be the people in our own 
neighbourhoods, in our own cities, on our own streets. These threatening individuals are those 
that do not quite fit in; they are familiar foreigners. Similarly it explores the discourses of who 
should be afforded trust and protection within multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural political 
and social environments, who exhibits social membership and who should be excluded. The 
language of austerity and shortage suggests that security is not a human right that all people are 
entitled to equally.  Rather if states can only afford to protect certain people, then by default the 
state chooses to actively not protect others. This article explores the social and physical 
consequences these decisions have, particularly when certain individuals decide that they will do 
what others only talk about: eliminate enemies. 
It is our own wickedness -not foreigners. We have produced the poison.
 -- Norwegian Professor Thomas Hylland Eriksen [1]
There is no Roma problem; rather there is a Nazi Problem.[2]
-- Former Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány
Prologue:
In autumn 2010 immigrant communities and people of color in Malmö, Sweden had good reason 
to be afraid.  In September’s parliamentary election a small far-right political party that wishes to 
significantly curtail rights and access for immigrants -- Sweden Democrats (SD) -- cleared the 
threshold, garnering 6% of the vote, and won 20 seats. The party, which demands cuts in 
immigration, described Islam as Sweden’s biggest threat since the Second World War.[3] In 
inflammatory television advertisements, which Swedish TV4 refused to air, the SD depicted a 
group of figures dressed in Burkas, jostling against an elderly white woman, pushing a walker no 
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less, to get to the head of the benefits queue.  The voice over said “politics is all about priorities; 
now you have a choice.” Coincident to this small party’s significant electoral showing, 
immigrants and minorities were being targeted by a gunman as they waited at lonely bus stops, 
walked along footpaths, or just sat in their cars.Although the shooting spree began nearly a year 
before the September election, there was a sense that the pace of the shootings quickened 
following the elections.  In total there were twenty-one shootings, which killed one person and 
injured many others.[4] The daughter of Turkish immigrants, who was afraid to go outside, told 
BBC Radio 4 that she was angry that her “entire life is being dictated by a single gunman.”[5] 
Indeed the gunman held Malmö rapt. Dubbed the “Race Gunman”[6] or the ‘racist sniper”, Peter 
Mangs was eventually arrested on 7 November and was formally charged with one count of 
murder and five counts of attempted murder on 27 January 2011.[7] Unfortunately this was not 
the first time this kind of thing has happened, nor would it be the last.  
Selecting Targets:
After the July 2011 shootings in Norway, media and political attention shifted to examine threats 
posed from far-right political extremists, and rightfully so. Although the Oslo car bomb and 
subsequent mass shooting took much of the mainstream press and so-called median voters across 
Europe by surprise, elements of the far-right have been in action for a quite some time, and more 
recently their violence has escalated, intensified, and grown more protracted. This article 
examines how such intense, and at times widespread violence goes largely unnoticed; it also 
examines whom is targeted by these groups, and how mainstream politics support and even 
legitimate this violence.  
In June 2011 the U.N. agency for refugees, the UNHCR, issued warnings that in certain Athens 
neighborhoods “fascist groups had established their own lawless regimes.”[8] During three days 
of racist attacks in May, gangs of neo-fascists rampaged through prominently Asian and African 
immigrant areas stabbing more than 25 people.  In reaction the UNHCR wrote: “there has been a 
dangerous escalation in…racist violence targeting indiscriminately aliens, based solely on their 
skin color.”[9] Naim Elgandour, the Egyptian born head of the Muslim Association in Greece 
told the Associate Press that he believed that there may be as many as 5,000 active hardcore 
right-wing extremists in Athens alone, who “are gaining sympathy and tolerance by the day.”[10] 
Gone from far-right politics is the stigma associated with the military dictatorship that ruled 
Greece from 1967-1974.  But this is not a new phenomenon. Twenty years ago immigrants were 
being targeted for their skin color at the opposite end of Europe, in an area long thought of for its 
tolerance and social democracy.       
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From August 1991 to January 1992 John Ausonius shot eleven people in Stockholm and 
Uppsala, killing one. He became known popularly and in the media as “Laserman” as he used a 
laser-guided sight on his rifle. As T-shirts appeared on the streets of Stockholm celebrating his 
exploits, it became clear that the violence directed at Stockholm’s immigrant communities was 
different.[11] It was violence directed at the other. Quickly Laserman became a local “hero”, 
taking upon himself what so many others would only talk about. For those that lionized him 
knew that they would never be the target of his rage or rifle, for they felt themselves to be, and 
obviously recognizable as, “true Swedes.” Arrested in 1992 and sentenced to life in prison in 
1994, Ausonius gave extensive interviews to Gellert Tamas, to whom he admitted that he was 
inspired by the 1991 election debates about immigrants, when a similar, small vehemently anti-
immigrant party, New Democracy, set the tone and terms of debate, won a number of seats in the 
parliament, and set about to denounce and limit any immigrants’ access to the largess of the state. 
Ausonius told Tamas that he “felt moral support; that the people stood behind him.” He stated 
explicitly that he felt “ political support from the (populist anti-immigrant party) New 
Democracy, and also from other political parties.”[12] He felt he was doing the right thing in 
defense of Swedish people.
With Anders Breivik’s recent car bombing in Oslo, and shooting spree on Utøya Island, the 
specter of the far-right rising over the European political landscape has been recognized. While it 
may be easy to dismiss his claim that he acted to defend a Christian Europe as that of a single, 
perhaps deranged, individual acting alone, he was inspired by the political climate around him. 
Beyond Oslo he reached out to groups like the English Defense League (EDL), although there is 
no sign of a larger conspiracy with the group for further action. Nevertheless, prominent British 
businessman and funder of the EDL, Alan Lake, appeared on Norwegian Television saying that 
he would be happy to execute extremist Muslims. The Independent reports that Lake said: 
“[Such Muslims] are not respecting that which respects the state and as far as I am concerned I'd 
be happy to execute people like that.”[13] Broader political society often takes solace in the 
notion that such utterances are anomalous, and that such individuals are rare, isolated, loners, and 
yet these individuals often act out the implied imperatives of mainstream discourses and political 
themes. These themes are becoming increasing expressed in dire terms, which allow for no 
compromise, suggest that “whole ways of life” may be in danger of becoming extinct, and 
require steadfast and decisive action.
Ideocide: You are with us or against us!
Since 9/11 the political discussion surrounding terrorism in the mainstream media has been flat.  
One factor is a tendency in the US and UK for the “media to ignore the social causes of 
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terrorism.”[14] Rather terrorists are treated as objects of fear, and as such they are not social or 
political beings. This forestalls the possibility of engaging in any reasonable debate; it also 
renders such actors as essentially non-political.  Aly and Green suggest that the result is a notion 
that “terrorists are motivated by inner torments and not politics.”[15] What motivates the terrorist 
is that “they hate us” or “they hate our freedom” or “our way of life.” All “terrorists” become 
linked together regardless of their political environments, and as such are characterized by their 
non-normative behavior. The flipside of this proposition becomes that all people who engage in 
“non-normative behavior”, those who engage positions outside of what is perceived as 
mainstream political activity, can come to be seen as “terrorists.” During the “Dirty War” in 
Argentina (1976-1983) this sentiment was pervasive following General Jorge Rafael Videl’s 
declaration: “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads 
ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization.”[16]
Arjun Appadurai has identified such assertions as “ideocide”, whereby people, concepts and 
ways of life come to be regarded as so noxious and so “outside the circle of humanity as to 
comprise an appropriate target for what Orlando Patterson called ‘social death.’”[17] The danger 
is to mistake a critique of hegemonic discourse as an act standing “outside of the circle of 
humanity.”  Those cast as “them” are subject to threats of violence in the name of self-defense by 
the group-self, which is defined as those being under threat from the “violence” of the other.  In 
this way, the boundary between “us” and “them” is set through two performative acts: the first is 
the act of feeling threatened. If you are not under threat, if you do not feel threatened by an 
insurgent minority, then you are not part of the “substantive majority” under threat. The second is 
to act against the “threat” – the minority. This may appear tautological but it is an important act 
of distinction: what the “substantive majority” has in common is the feeling of being under 
threat.  
Those who do not share this fear are either part of the threating minority, insinuating the 
paranoid-schizoid construction of “you are with us or against us”, or they are part of the 
“substantive majority” but do not know it yet. This itself is a conflation, for it shifts the 
understanding of the role of minority as a dynamic, liberal, procedural concept – one which is in 
constant flux and reorganization – to an ethno-linguistic-cultural one that is fixed and engaged in 
a static zero-sum game. Here the dissenter – the procedural minority of opinion – is linked to a 
threat to transform the majority into a minority; that is, the minority represents a threat to defeat 
all that the “majority” stands for. The very existence of an oppositional minority is noxious to the 
majority. But this too morphs a particular political position into “substantive majority.” These are 
what Appadurai describes as “predatory identities”, which incite self-understood or declared 
“majorities to fear that they are becoming minorities, and fear that minorities are becoming 
majorities.”[18]
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In defense against small numbers becoming large, some take matters into their own hands, 
transforming social death into physical death. In these moments of fear – fear of the economy, of 
terrorism, of the uncertain and the unknown – the paranoid-schizoid position that divides the 
world into “us” and “them” engenders discourses to eliminate the threat – to eliminate the other. 
Just as political discourse can mobilize civic action, so too can it mobilize violent action. This 
conflation of opponents and enemies transforms potential allies into adversaries, both 
discursively and socially Discursively the “majority” claims the right or the power to define 
membership in the collective, often in a fashion beyond both normative and juridical practice.  
Yet, it is not a right for them to claim.  
In practice, this hostility, this intolerance, makes it difficult for members of a society who have 
been declared as “other” to believe they are welcome within the very society they call home. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to have deep emotional attachments to a place or society that is 
discriminatory, prejudiced, or actively working to frighten, displace, or harm you. This can lead 
to a vicious circle in which those who are rhetorically “expelled” retreat into their own 
neighborhoods, cultural practices, or social networks.[19] The act of seeking moral and social 
support among allies can be read as disengagement, often by the very initiators of the rhetorical 
expulsion. Through the construction of a narrative disengagement of the other, the initiators of 
the rhetoric of expulsion often justify physical acts of violence against the other; any resistance is 
further proof of their very “otherness.” It is a rhetorical trap with potentially physically harmful 
consequences. In the name of being fearful, members of the self-described or proclaimed 
majority, commit acts of violence that terrify other communities.
For example, Krisztina Morvai, a Member of the European Parliament from the Hungarian 
political party Jobbik – a Hungarian play on words meaning both the better choice and a more 
right-wing option, and which The Guardian recent described as a “neo-fascist party[20] -- 
nominated György Budaházy for the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Prize for languishing in 
a Hungarian jail for more than a year without being charged.[21] Only a few days later, 
Budaházy and sixteen associates were indicted on suspicion to commit terrorism for bomb plots, 
attacks on journalists including the severe beating of a television presenter, arson attacks, bomb 
making, and the fire bombings of homes and buildings belonging to Socialist politicians. Morvai 
can often been seen walking the halls of the European Parliament in Brussels wearing a “Free 
Budhazáy” t-shirt.[22]
As Jobbik and the right in general have continued to garner political strength in Hungary 
recently, much of their rhetoric has centered on the question of who is a “true Hungarian.” In 
April 2011, the Hungarian Red Cross offered bus evacuation to nearly three hundred Roma who 
feared further attacks on their village of Gyöngyöspata, which had been under “patrol” for four 
weeks by the Jobbik supported group Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb Jövőért 
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Polgárőr Egyesület). According to Hungarian Watch, the group woke Roma residents in the 
night, prevented them from going about their business, threatened them with weapons, and 
severely beat 17.[23] The Szebb Jövőért claimed that they were trying to protect Hungarians and 
prevent “Gypsycrime”.[24] The Jobbik Member of Parliament Gergely Rubi said that the group 
was in Gyöngyöspata to “improve public order and security.”[25] The suggestion is that Roma 
are not in need of security or protection, but are the threat, to which the former Hungarian Prime 
Minister Fernec Gyurcsány replied: “there is no Roma problem, there is a Nazi problem.”[26]
Muslim = Threat
In Denmark, the distinction between “New Danes” and unqualified Danes represents the 
boundary between entitlement to state benefits as the autochthonous, and the perpetually 
insecure position of being [barely] tolerated as the allochthonous. In the Netherlands Geert 
Wilders’ growing political prominence appears to signal the continued collapse of tolerance that 
was notably initiated with the parliamentary bid of Pim Fortuyn in 2002.  Wilders has echoed 
many of Fortuyn’s sentiments, such as writing in the De Volkskrant “I have had enough of Islam 
in the Netherlands; let not one more Muslim immigrate.”[27] He has called the Koran a “fascist 
book” which should be banned, and his denouncements of Islam have been so inflammatory that 
he is presently being tried in court for “inciting hatred against Muslims.”[28] Similar to the 
electoral performance of Jobbik, and better than that of the Sweden Democrats, Wilders’ 
Freedom Party is the third largest party in the Netherlands, having won 24 of the 150 seats in last 
summer’s parliamentary election.  The entire freedom Party campaign can be seen as a screed 
against Muslims in the Netherlands.
Unfortunately there has also been a shift in the United States whereby “Muslim” is becoming a 
pejorative term, suggesting outsider status and indicating potential danger.  Much of this rhetoric 
has been associated with the U.S. Tea Party movement, and became prominent over last 
summer’s plans for an Islamic cultural center to be built in Lower Manhattan, a number of blocks 
away from World Trade Centre reconstruction site. These plans suddenly became described as 
the “plot” to build a “mosque at Ground Zero”, and sparked heated partisan debate across the 
American polity.  In towns far from New York, often with few Muslims, similar debates and 
controversy roiled over during the long hot days of summer. At the end of August 2010, gunshots 
were fired at mosque in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, a suburb of Nashville, not long after that 
state’s lieutenant governor, said at a rally of opponents to the Murfeesboro mosque, “that is Islam 
is a cult and not a religion.”[29] In front of a Temecula, California mosque one protestor held 
aloft a sign that read “Mosques are Monuments to Terrorism.” [30]
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But not only are Muslims perceived as enemies, but enemies are perceived as Muslim.  In an 
August 2010 Pew Charitable Trust poll, nearly one-in-five Americans believed that President 
Obama is a Muslim.  Moreover this mistaken view -- Obama is a practicing Christian – has a 
political hue to it. 34% conservative Republicans believe that Obama is a Muslim compared with 
the 18% of the general voting age population; likewise 30% of those who disapprove of the 
president’s job performance, believe he is a Muslim. This belief has grown since Obama took 
office, rising sharply from 11% of the general population in March of 2009 to the current 18%.  
When asked how they learned of Obama’s religion, 60% of respondent cite the “media” and 11% 
say they have “learned this through Obama’s own word and behaviors.”[31] It is in this claim 
that the consequences of such a discursive conflation become increasingly apparent and perhaps 
dangerous. We see a collapse of the distinction between opponent and enemy here, as Obama’s 
political opponents see him as a political enemy.  
Guns Don’t Kill People: (Non)Political Violence in the U.S.
Not only “terrorists” are “wanted dead or alive” in the U.S.; the political adversaries of the Tea 
Party movement and other conservatives were “targeted”, as are other “enemies” of the 
American way of life. In the run-up to 2010 mid-term Congressional elections Republican 
senatorial candidate Sharon Angle of Nevada told a conservative radio talk show host Lars 
Larson “if Congress keeps going the way that it is, people are looking toward Second 
Amendment remedies.”[32] Asked later about the meaning of the comment, Larson said that “if 
[Congress] continues to do the things it’s doing, she left open the possibility of armed 
insurrection.”[33] Robert Spitzer, author of The Politics of Gun Control said Angle’s intention 
was clear.  Speaking on the radio show Fresh Air, Spritzer said of Angle’s comments: “Its 
meaning is clear; ‘if I do not get my way in the electoral process, I reserve for myself the right to 
pick up a gun and to see that I get my way in the political realm.’ Her comment is the intersection 
of politics and armed violence.”[34]
The U.S. politician Sarah Palin identified twenty key congressional seats as essential to roll back 
the policies of the Obama administration. Each of these twenty seats was indicated with a gun 
sight over the district on a map published on Palin’s web site in March of 2010. Following the 
publication of the map, three campaign headquarters of democratic candidates in these districts 
were attacked and vandalized. One of those targeted, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, told 
MSNBC’s Chuck Todd “Palin put crosshairs of a gun sight over our district; when people do 
that, they’ve got to realize there’s consequences.”[35] Todd responded, “campaign rhetoric and 
war rhetoric have always been interchangeable”, not noticing the very example of calling the 
period approaching an election a “campaign” is a military metaphor. But Giffords held fast, 
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suggesting something was notably aggressive about the then recent rhetoric  She said that 
colleagues from the House of Representatives with tenures of “20, 30 years” have said they have 
never seen vitriol like this.[36] It appeared that opponents were no longer part of the group self. 
As these opponents are seen as members of the other, and not merely part of a loyal opposition 
(never mind that these elements actually were the government and often are a numerical majority 
or at least plurality in opinion polling), it is permissible to target them with threats of violence, if 
not actual violence. 
Giffords was threatened again at an August 2010 Tucson campaign rally; an attendee 
conspicuously “dropped” a handgun while Giffords defended Obama’s policies. Tucson Tea 
Party co-founder Trent Humphries told the Arizona Daily Star that Giffords misread the dropped 
gun, saying “no one is targeting Gabi.”[37] How wrong he was. On 7 January 2011, Giffords was 
shot point-blank in the head along with 19 other people, six of whom died, including nine-year 
old, Christina Green, and U.S. Federal judge John Roll. Investigators found that the shooter Jared 
L. Loughner, had engaged in methodical and meticulous planning, including hand written notes 
detailing his intensions that included the heading “I planned ahead.”[38]
These were not the only attacks in response to Obama’s policies On 18 July 2010 Byron 
Williams was involved in a shootout with two California Highway Patrol officers.  His mother 
told the San Francisco Chronicle that he was “upset by the way Congress was railroading 
through all of these left-wing agenda items.”[39] He was on his way to “begin a revolution” by 
attacking a California NGO, Tides, which had “become something of a whipping boy of [the 
U.S. conservative television personality Glenn] Beck.”[40] Beck stated frequently on his 
programme that the founder of the organization, Van Jones, was a “communist” responsible for 
“shaping the views of the President of the United States.” However, following the shooting 
Bryon Williams was simply described as “disturbed”, as was the “distraught” man who, in an 
eerie echo of 9/11, flew his private plane into the Austin, Texas offices of the Internal Revenue 
Service, killing himself, an IRS manager, and injuring 13 others in February 2010.[41] In April 
2009 white supremacist Richard Poplawski went on a shooting spree killing three Pittsburgh 
police officers, and wounding a fourth; press reports described him as “nothing but trouble,”[42] 
just as Jared Loughner was repeatedly described as “distraught and disturbed.” The connection 
between the acts of violence themselves and a permissive environment of public officials 
appearing to condone violence, is undermined by the parallel claims that the perpetrators of 
violence were disturbed, mentally unbalanced individuals, acting alone. 
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Autochthones and Allochthones: A Conclusion
These political and social reactions to distinguish between a wholly known and familiar “us” and 
a threatening and alien “them” is associated with what Appadurai described as the complex 
response to intolerable levels of uncertainty about group identities.[43] Appadurai describes how 
the contemporary exercises of “counting” and “naming” populations for the purposes of 
determining access to resources, privileges of voting and citizenship, as well as mobility and 
accumulation, creates a situation whereby “large numbers of people [turn] immoderately 
suspicious about the “real” identities of their neighbors.”[44] Those suspicious of the other then 
work to identify further “insurgents” who wear “false masks” and who “pretend” to support the 
majority but in truth work against it.
This is linked to the concept of “autochthony” where claims to citizenship, rights, even the idea 
of personhood, are tied to one’s ability to demonstrate that they come from a particular place, as 
opposed to migrants or foreigners. Baukje Prins and Sawitri Saharso describe how in the 
Netherlands, there is a growing “gap between ‘autochthones and ‘allochthones’, between those 
who are already a (integrated) part of the social body, and those who are constituted as its 
‘outside.’”[45] In places of melding cultures, labour migration, asylum seeking, and great human 
flows, this is a very disturbing idea.  Extreme violence emerges when social trust erodes and the 
very existence of the other is seen as a threat Markers of everyday distinction such as speaking a 
different first language, or having an unfamiliar name, or eating unfamiliar foods, or practicing a 
different faith, quickly becomes indexes of different worldviews, and perhaps having different 
social values and mores. This shift entails an assertion of the ubiquity of certain cultural practices 
and normative positions, whereby difference becomes equated with foreignness.  But such 
assertions ignore that there may have been differences all along, subtle and quiet differences that 
existed peacefully and easily with an assumption of homogeneity, even when it never existed. 
Difference becomes pertinent when it is accentuated and foregrounded.
These shifts come not only from propaganda and the rants of television and radio broadcasts and 
large-scale politics, but also from the very near, the very local, or from what Appadurai calls “the 
wounds of everyday life.”[46] Encounters and scuffles bring misunderstandings and minor 
grudges, which grow with the powerful social fertilizer of rumor. Larger narratives of social 
distrust, providing the “proof” and the “truth” of the alien and threatening qualities of the other, 
validate these little doubts and suspicions, these misgivings and perceptions of betrayal.  It is a 
powerful and destructive cycle whereby all parties know the “truth” about the other, and each 
encounter creates a new gaffe or misstep that increases the breadth and depth of the cleavages 
between groups.
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For Will Kymlicka the most dangerous situation arises when the state tries to manage the social 
and political rifts within the polity through securitization. In such circumstances those deemed to 
be a threat become the objects of suspicion, surveillance, and interdiction in the name of 
protecting others not deemed to pose a threat. In such cases relations between minority groups 
and the majority population are not a matter of normal debate, negotiation and discursive 
encounter, mediating demands for resource allocations or access to social spaces and position.  
Rather the relationship between the minority and the rest of the population is a matter of security 
services minimizing threat potential. In such circumstances the state will “limit the democratic 
process to protect itself,”[47] possibly resulting in the prohibition of political or social 
mobilisation, or the denial of avenues of redress or grievance articulation. Kymlicka asserts that 
the logic of securitization itself “erodes both the democratic space to voice minority demands 
and the likelihood that those demands would be accepted.”[48] Here appears the danger from the 
far-right; demands for cultural and political homogeneity denies the expression of dissent in its 
many forms. Hungarians who work to protect Roma come to be seen as not “true Hungarians”; 
Anders Breivik attacked the Labour party’s summer camp because he believed that institution 
was responsible for increased immigration, about which there could be no further discussion. 
When ideas are seen as threats to security, when there can be no more discussion, then politics 
have become poisonous. Kymlicka concludes that social group relations have to be “taken out of 
the ‘security’ box and placed back into the ‘democratic politics’ box.[49] Until that happens 
perhaps the people of Malmö still have reason to be afraid.
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